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Abstract
In recent work, semantic games of independence-friendly logic were
studied in strategic form in terms of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria.
The class of strategic games of independence-friendly logic is contained
in the class of win-loss, zero-sum two-player games. In this note we draw
on the theory of linear programming to develop tools to analyze the value
of such games. We give two applications of these tools to independence-
friendly logic under the so-called equilibrium semantics.
1 Introduction
At the heart of game-theoretic semantics [7, 8] lies the understanding that
meaning emerges as the result of the interaction between rational agents
who act in their own interest according to a set of rules. The meaning that
arises thus is attached to the linguistic expression that constitutes this set
of rules. The concept of game was used to flesh out this understand-
ing, a concept that was also applied by Wittgenstein to the philosophy
of (natural) language [16]. A sample game, well known in the context
of independence-friendly logic, is defined by the following set of rules pa-
rameterized by a function f . First an opponent chooses an x and ε > 0
on the reals. Then we choose a δ > 0 independent of x. The interaction
terminates after the opponent has chosen a y. We “win” if the series of
objects satisfies the condition
|x− y| < δ implies |f(x)− f(y)| < ε, (1)
otherwise the opponent “wins”.
The linguistic expression of this rule set, in the syntax of independence-
friendly (IF) logic, is
∀x∀ε(∃δ/x)∀yψ(x,ε, δ, y),
where ψ(x, ε, δ, y) is a formalization of (1). In game-theoretic semantics,
the meaning of the latter expression, or any IF sentence for that matter,
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is defined as the conditions under which we win the game. We will make
this more precise in due course.
For now it is important to emphasize that game-theoretic semantics
puts rule-governed interaction at the center of attention, and that meaning
is derived from it. This view must be contrasted to the view according
to which the meaning of a logical expression is determined by conditions
under which it is “true” in a (formalized) state of affairs. It seems that
Tarski semantics for first-order logic is a formal counterpart of this view.
Interaction between self-interested agents is studied in game theory. In
this area, a (pure) strategy for a player completely specifies how to move
in each choice point for that player. If we are given one strategy of each
player in a game (in the formal, game-theoretic sense of the word), then
we can traverse the sequence of choice points that arise if we follow the
moving player’s strategy. The respective players’ payoffs are distributed
among the players once the terminal node in this sequence is reached. A
win-loss game is a game in which the players can either win (i.e., receive
payoff 1) or lose (i.e., receive 0). In the context of a win-loss game, a
strategy is winning if it results in a win for its owner against each strategy
of its opponent.
Game-theoretic semantics for independence-friendly logic was devel-
oped (first in spirit [9], then in formalism [3]) in the framework of exten-
sive games. This framework considers a game as a game tree in which each
node corresponds to a choice point for a player or a terminal node (i.e.,
a node in which payoff is returned to the players). Folklore has it that
semantic games of IF logic are played between Eloise and Abelard. The
game tree that formalizes the interactions between Eloise and Abelard
constituting the meaning of an IF sentence φ in the context of a suitable
structure M is called an extensive game of imperfect information, denoted
G(M, φ).
The meaning of φ can be seen to emerge from interaction in G(M, φ),
by inspecting that the condition
φ is true on M (written M |=+ φ) (2)
coincides with the condition
Eloise has a winning strategy in the game G(M, φ), (3)
and that
φ is false on M (written M |=− φ) (4)
coincides with
Abelard has a winning strategy in the game G(M, φ). (5)
From a logical point of view, game-theoretic semantics has several
advantages. Its tree-based view nicely reflects the dependence between
nested quantifiers. Conditions (2) to (5) show us how one particular type
of interaction coincides with the meaning of IF sentences, at least in terms
of their truth and falsity conditions.
The equivalences between Conditions (2) to (5) show us how known
grounds — i.e., the Tarskian notions of truth and falsity — can be covered
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by game-theoretical semantics. They also give us a lead for exploring un-
charted territory. Namely, we see that the above conditions are based on
one mode of interaction only, that is, one player having a winning strat-
egy. Thus a whole research agenda unfolds itself in front of us: analyzing
the interrelations between game-theoretic interactions on the one hand
and the meanings that arise from them on the other hand. The Match-
ing Pennies sentence φMP serves to illustrate the type of questions that
motivate this agenda:
∀x(∃y/x)x = y
On structuresM with more than one element, neither player has a winning
strategy in the game G(M, φMP). Such games are said to be undetermined.
The games G(M, φMP) are not covered by the Conditions (3) and (5), as
if no meaning can be seen to emerge from them.
This observation can be made more precise. Every IF sentence φ
partitions the class of suitable structures in three:
(
[[φ]]−, [[φ]]6±, [[φ]]+
)
,
where [[φ]]+ denotes the set of structures on which Eloise has a winning
strategy, [[φ]]− denotes the set of structures on which Abelard has a win-
ning strategy, and [[φ]]6± contains the other structures, i.e., the structures
on which neither player has a winning strategy. In the case of the Match-
ing Pennies sentence, [[φMP]]
+ is the set of structures with one element;
[[φMP]]
− is empty; and [[φMP]]
6± is the set of structures with more than one
element. The observation that game-theoretic semantics does not cover
the undetermined games of φMP, i.e. the games on [[φMP]]
6±, touches on
the following question: How can we give a direct definition of [[φ]]6±? —
understanding that its present definition, stated in terms of the absence
of a winning strategy for either player, is indirect.
We can also study the class of semantic games as a game-theoretic
entity in its own right and ignore the fact that each game in this class is
constituted by an IF sentence and a structure. From such a point of view,
it is only natural1 to generalize from pure strategies to mixed strategies,
those being the dominant species of strategies in game theory. Mixed
strategies are studied more naturally in the framework of strategic games,
which ignore the games’ sequential turn-taking dynamics. Finally, instead
of studying winning (pure) strategies, we can now shift our attention to
equilibrium mixed strategies, that is, mixed strategies that cannot be
improved upon by any of the players.
In a recent publication [14], rooted in an observation by Ajtai [1] and
anticipated in [13, 5], the strategic game theory of IF games was developed.
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over a set of pure strategies.
If Eloise and Abelard both play mixed strategies, that is, if they pick their
pure strategies at random according to their mixed strategies, the pair of
pure strategies that will be played is effectively selected from the lottery
determined by the product of their mixed strategies. If we associate payoff
0 with Eloise losing the outcome of playing two pure strategies against
each other, and 1 with her winning, we can define the expected payoff of
1The author is grateful to Allen L. Mann for suggesting this point of view.
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Eloise as the expected utility that is returned to her in this lottery. It is
not hard to see that Eloise’s expected utility falls in [0, 1].
Informally, an equilibrium is a state of the game in which the players’
powers to influence the outcome are in balance, or, somewhat more for-
mally, it is a pair of mixed strategies in which neither player can benefit
from unilateral deviation. The value of a strategic game between Eloise
and Abelard is defined as Eloise’s expected utility of an equilibrium.
In [14], the strategic IF game Γ(M, φ) was defined as the strategic
counterpart of the extensive game G(M, φ). It was further postulated
that the value of φ on M is the value of Γ(M, φ), that is, Eloise’s expected
utility in Γ(M, φ). For instance, as is easily proven (see also Example 6
below), the Matching Pennies sentence has value 1/n on structures of size
n. The notation M |=ε φ was introduced to indicate that φ has value ε
on M. We will introduce the framework of equilibrium semantics and key
results more rigorously in the next section, including the results by which
every finite strategic IF game has one unique value.
The strategic view disregards the sequential turn-taking of the games
trees, which are so nicely reflected the quantifier alternation of IF sen-
tences. In return we get a formalism in which the notion of strategy is
atomic. This somehow matches the way in which interaction is primitive
in the philosophy behind game-theoretic semantics. Furthermore, it is to
be understood that the strategic view on semantic games is a generaliza-
tion of the extensive view, in the sense that conditions can be found in
terms of equilibrium mixed strategies that are equivalent to Conditions
2 and 5. Indeed, one of the first results about equilibrium semantics,
reiterated in the next section, has it that
[[φ]]− = [[φ]]0 (6)
[[φ]]+ = [[φ]]1, (7)
where [[φ]]ε denotes the class of structures on which φ has value ε. This
result shows that equilibrium semantics is a conservative extension of
traditional game-theoretic semantics. It also shows that [[φ]]6±, which was
defined indirectly in game-theoretic semantics, can be defined directly in
equilibrium semantics:
[[φ]]6± =
⋃
ε∈(0,1)
[[φ]]ε. (8)
It is yet to be seen what type of meaning is constituted by the interac-
tion studied in equilibrium semantics. At present, no coherent semantic
interpretation has been given of very the notion of value. In an attempt to
get a handle on the problem of interpreting |=ε consider the partitioning
(
[[φ]]ε
)
ε∈[0,1]
for any IF sentence φ. For instance, [[φMP]]
1/n contains the structures of
size n. With each class [[φ]]ε we can seek a logical expression ψε that de-
fines it, in the sense that M ∈ [[φ]]ε if, and only if, ψε is true on M. From
a model-theoretic point of view we are interested in the logical languages
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in which such ψ can be defined, whereas, from a more philosophical view-
point, we are interested to learn the interrelations between the sentences
in (
ψε
)
ε∈[0,1]
.
For instance, how does ψε relate to ψ1, which expresses φ’s truth condi-
tions, and ψ0, which expresses its falsity conditions?
One of the obstacles we are facing in this respect is the informal way
of thinking about game-theoretical semantics. For instance, we grew used
to thinking of Eloise “wanting” to prove that the sentence φ is true, and
Abelard “wanting” to prove that it is false. In the case of the Matching
Pennies sentence, this would mean that Eloise wants to establish that the
structure has one element and that Abelard wants to establish the logical
contradiction, whatever that may mean.
In equilibrium semantics, it is unclear what semantic relation Eloise
and Abelard want to establish between φ and M. For all we know, Eloise
and Abelard want to maximize their payoff in Γ(M, φ), but what does
that tell us about the relation between φ and M?
Another obstacle for understanding |=ε is the fact that we lack tools to
analyze strategic IF games. Establishing the series (ψε)ε∈[0,1] of seemingly
simple φ may take several pages of text, especially if φ is interpreted on
arbitrary graph-like structures. To grasp this point it is instructive to
realize that the problem of determining the value of an arbitrary win/loss
game with values 0 and 1 reduces to the problem of determining the value
of ∀x(∃y/x)R(x,y), in the sense that if we have an algorithm to solve the
latter, we can tweak it to solve the former.
This computational concern touches on the worst-case computational
complexity of determining the value of an arbitrary win/loss game. It is
known that this problem can be defined as a linear programming prob-
lem, for which efficient (polynomial time) algorithms have been proposed.
Unfortunately, these algorithm are fairly intricate, which as yet renders
them quite useless, in their current forms, for establishing the value of
strategic IF games.
In this paper, we shall exploit the linear programming view on strategic
IF games to develop a set of tools for determining and approximating their
value. It is important to realize that the tools developed in this way are
weaker than the efficient algorithms that were proposed earlier to solve
arbitrary linear programming problem. If our results have any merits, it
may be in the fact that they help us to more easily determine the value of
certain strategic IF games, or that they inspire the construction of more
powerful tools.
In the next section, we will review definitions and elementary results
of equilibriums semantics. In Section 3 we present some tools to analyze
win-loss, zero-sum, two-player strategic game. In Section 4 we apply these
tools to analyze the values of two IF sentences that pertain to the birthday
problem and hashing.
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2 Preliminaries
An extensive game G describes all positions of the game and how it pro-
ceeds from one to the other. In an extensive game with players P , each
player p ∈ P has a set of (pure) strategies Sp. A pure strategy is essen-
tially a rule book that prescribes how its owner moves in every position
of the game (i.e., history) in which it is his/her turn. A definition of
extensive games can be found in [3, 10].
A strategy profile (for the players P ) σ¯ is a function that selects an
appropriate strategy for each player in P . If P = {p0, . . . , pn−1} we shall
also write σ¯ as the sequence (σp0 , . . . , σpn−1). An extensive game G has
a utility function up for each player p that assigns a real value to each of
the game’s strategy profiles.
We shall be interested in two-player games, so that our strategy profiles
contain two strategies. We shall use the symbols ∃ and ∀ to mark the
game’s contestants, Eloise and Abelard: P = {∃,∀}. Moreover we shall
focus on win-loss and zero-sum games, that is, the utility functions u∃ and
u∀ will be functions with range {0, 1} such that for each strategy profile
(σ, τ ), u∃(σ, τ ) + u∀(σ, τ ) = 1. Since in this type of games, u∀ is uniquely
determined by u∃, we shall simply write u for u∃ and mostly ignore u∀.
A pure strategy σ ∈ Sp is winning in a win-loss, zero-sum game if
up(σ, τ ) = 1 for each strategy τ of p’s opponent p¯.
Independence-friendly logic is the extension of first-order logic whose
quantifiers (Qx/X) are furnished with sets of variables X indicating that
the choice of quantifier Qx be made independent from the variables in X.
In this paper we shall only use the syntax of IF logic when we apply our
game-theoretic results to express certain properties. We refer the reader
to [10] for a comprehensive introduction to the field of IF logic, which also
introduces more gently the basic notions of equilibrium semantics.
Sentences of IF logic are evaluated on structures
M =
(
M,RM0 , R
M
1 , . . . , f
M
0 , f
M
1 , . . .
)
,
where M is the universe of M, RMi is the interpretation of relation symbol
Ri and f
M
i is the interpretation of function symbol fi, as usual.
The semantic game of an IF sentence φ on a structure M gives rise to
the (extensive) IF game G(M, φ), which is a two-player, win-loss and zero-
sum game. It is also a game of imperfect information if φ has quantifiers
(Qx/X) in which X is nonempty.
The framework of strategic game theory gives another way of looking
at games. Suppose that G is the extensive formalization of a game. Then,
the strategic form of the same game would be
Γ =
(
(Sp)p∈P , (up)p∈P
)
,
where P is the set of players as before, Sp is the set of p’s pure strategies
in G, and up is player p’s utility function in G. The strategic game Γ is
two-player/win-loss/zero-sum, whenever G is. We shall write Γ(M, φ) for
the strategic IF game that is the strategic counterpart of the extensive IF
game G(M, φ).
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A mixed strategy µp of player p in Γ is a probability distribution over
Sp, that is, µp is a function for which for every σ ∈ Sp, 0 ≤ µp(σ) ≤ 1, and∑
σ∈Sp
µp(σ) = 1. The mixed strategy µp is uniform if it assigns equal
probability to each pure strategy in Sp. We say that µp is uniform in T ,
for any T ⊆ Sp, if the domain of µp is T and if it assigns equal probability
to each pure strategy in T .
We extend the notion of strategy profile to mixed strategies; whence a
strategy profile may also refer to a sequence (µp)p∈P of mixed strategies.
A strategy profile of mixed strategies defines a lottery over the set of
outcomes of the game, that is, strategy profile (σp)p∈P is drawn with
likelihood ∏
p∈P
µp(σp).
The expected utility for player p is given by p’s expected utility in the
lottery. For a strategy profile of mixed strategies (µ∃, µ∀), the expected
utility is defined as as
Up(µ∃, µ∀) =
∑
σ∈S∃
∑
τ∈S∀
µ∃(σ)µ∀(τ )up(σ, τ ).
If Γ is a zero-sum and win-loss game between ∃ and ∀, then we have
that U∃(µ, ν) + U∀(µ, ν) = 1. In this case, for the same reason as before,
we shall write U for U∃ and forget about U∀.
The theory of mixed strategy equilibrium predicts that Eloise and
Abelard will settle on a pair of mixed strategies in which neither player
benefits from unilateral deviation, that is, from choosing another mixed
strategy.
Definition 1. Let Γ be a two-player strategic game. The strategy profile
(µ∃, µ∀) is an equilibrium (in mixed strategies) in Γ if for each player
p ∈ {∃,∀},
Up(µp, µp¯) ≥ Up(µ
′
p, µp¯)
for each mixed strategy µ′p of p.
A strategy in an equilibrium is called an equilibrium strategy.
The Minimax Theorem (see Theorem 2 below) shows that every fi-
nite, two-player, zero-sum game Γ has an equilibrium. Nash [11] later
generalized this result to arbitrary finite strategic games, and this type of
equilibrium has henceforth been associated with his name. Since in this
work we shall only require the Minimax Theorem, we shall not use the
term Nash equilibrium despite the fact that it seems to be more common
in the literature on game theory.
It is not hard to see that if Γ has multiple equilibria, they all return
the same expected utility to Eloise. We call this the value of the game,
and write it as V (Γ). We define equilibrium semantics as the relation |=ε
for which
M |=ε φ iff V (Γ) = ε,
where Γ = Γ(M, φ). This relation is well defined for finite structures M,
but not necessarily on infinite structures. Thus, in this paper, we shall
only consider finite structures.
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The present definition of equilibrium semantics is not compositional,
that is, the value of an IF formula is not determined on the basis of the
values of its subformulas. Interestingly, it was shown by Galliani and
Mann [6] that compositionality can be restored by extending Hodges’
trump semantics with probability distributions over assignments. This
approach may yield other tools for analyzing the values of IF strategic
games.
3 Games
In this section we take a linear programming perspective on computing
the value of two-person, zero-sum strategic games that is known from
the literature [12]. This class of games contains the strategic IF games
as a subclass. Thus we can use insights obtained to construct tools for
computing and approximating the value of strategic IF games.
3.1 Linear programming
We write 0, . . . ,m − 1 for Eloise’s pure strategies and 0, . . . , n − 1 for
Abelard’s in a strategic game. If Eloise plays i and Abelard plays j,
Eloise receives u(i, j) ∈ {0, 1}. Oftentimes we shall consider the payoff
function u as a matrix:

u(0, 0) · · · u(0, n− 1)
...
. . .
...
u(m− 1, 0) · · · u(m− 1, n− 1)


In fact we shall regard such matrices u as games in their own right, under-
standing that Eloise controls the row strategies and Abelard controls the
column strategies. Accordingly we write V (u) for the value of the game
corresponding to the matrix u. Throughout this section the word “game”
designates any matrix u with entries carrying values in the range {0, 1},
unless specified otherwise.
The security level for Eloise in a game u is defined as
max
µ
min
ν
U(µ, ν),
where µ ranges over Eloise’s mixed strategies in u and ν over Abelard’s.
It may be instructive to take a game-theoretic view on the expression
maxµminν U(µ, ν). According to this view, the security level is the value
that is the result of a game between Maximizer and Minimizer. In this
game, Maximizer chooses a mixed strategy µ for maxµ. Then Minimizer
chooses a mixed strategy ν for minν knowing µ. The game ends and Max-
imizer receives U(µ, ν) and Minimizer receives 1− U(µ, ν). Thus the se-
curity level corresponds to the maximal value that Maximizer can secure.
Similarly, the security level for Abelard is defined as minν maxµ U(µ, ν).
Note the informational asymmetry between the games defined by
max
µ
min
ν
U(µ, ν)
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and
min
ν
max
µ
U(µ, ν).
In the former game Minimizer observes the move by Maximizer before she
picks her mixed strategy, whereas in the latter game Maximizer has the
informational advantage. Below we shall associate Maximizer with Eloise
and Minimizer with Abelard.
Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem [15] compares the players’ security
levels with each other and with the game’s value.
Theorem 2 (Minimax). For every zero-sum, two-player game u,
1. maxµminν U(µ, ν) = minν maxµ U(µ, ν); and
2. V (u) = maxµminν U(µ, ν).
The Minimax Theorem implies that the informational asymmetry be-
tween maxµminν and minν maxµ cannot be utilized by either player, that
is, it does not negatively affect her expected utility if Eloise hands over to
Abelard the strategy µ that maximizes minν U(µ, ν) before Abelard makes
his choice. In the same vein, it does not negatively affect Abelard’s ex-
pected utility if he hands over the strategy ν that minimizes maxµ U(µ, ν)
before Eloise makes her choice.
It is easy to check that for any given mixed strategy µ,
min
ν
U(µ, ν) = min
0≤j<n
U(µ, j), (9)
where U(µ, j) denotes the expected utility of Eloise if she plays µ against
the pure strategy j. So, whenever Eloise hands over her strategy µ, all
Abelard needs to do is compute the expected utility U(µ, j) for each of his
pure strategies j. If µ is an equilibrium strategy and j minimizes U(µ, j),
V (u) is equal to U(µ, j).
Introduce the variable µi to represent the value µ(i) that Eloise’s mixed
strategy µ assigns to her pure strategy i. We can regard µ as the row
vector [
µ0, . . . , µm−1
]
.
Multiplying Eloise’s strategy µ (as row vector) with u yields the row vector
[
U(µ, 0), . . . , U(µ, n− 1)
]
.
Reading Abelard’s strategy ν as a column vector, µuν is equal to U(µ, ν).
We write Rowu(i) for the ith row in u, which is a row vector, and
Colu(j) for the jth column in u, which is a column vector. For a vec-
tor of values v = [v0, . . . , vk−1], let Σv denote the sum of its elements:∑
0≤i<k vi. Clearly, for our u, ΣRow
u(i) coincides with the number of
nonzero entries in the ith row in u. We say that u is row balanced if all its
rows have the same sum: ΣRowu(i) = ΣRowu(i′), for all 0 ≤ i, i′ < m.
Similarly, we say that u is column balanced if ΣColu(j) = ΣColu(j′), for
all 0 ≤ j, j′ < n. A game is balanced if it is both row and column balanced.
If Eloise plays µ and Abelard plays j, Eloise’s expected utility U(µ, j)
is the product of µ and Colu(j). Consequently, Eloise’s task of maximizing
min
0≤j<n
U(µ, j)
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boils down to selecting a mixed strategy µ that maximizes the minimal
element v in [
µColu(0), . . . , µColu(n− 1)
]
,
that is, optimizing v subject to the following constraints:
µColu(0) ≥ v
...
µColu(n− 1) ≥ v,
plus (for every 0 ≤ i < n):
µi ≥ 0
and
µ0 + . . .+ µn−1 = 1.
The latter n + 1 constraints ensure that µ is a proper probability distri-
bution. Modulo some rewriting, the above constraints constitute a linear
programming problem. The solution, i.e., the optimized value for v, coin-
cides with Eloise’s security level in the underlying game, which coincides
with its value by the Minimax Theorem.
As an example consider the game:


1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0

 ,
which yields the following four constraints (in addition to the five con-
straints that ensure that µ is a probability distribution):
µ0 + µ2 + µ3 ≥ v
µ0 + µ1 + µ3 ≥ v
µ1 + µ2 + µ3 ≥ v
0 ≥ v.
Due to the fourth constraint, the maximum for v is 0 regardless of µ0, . . . , µ3.
Thus, whatever strategy Eloise plays, she has expected utility 0, that is,
Abelard has a winning strategy.
Flipping the bottom right value gives the game


1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1

 ,
yielding the same constraints as above, replacing the fourth by
µ3 ≥ v.
The maximum value for v is 1, realized by µ3 = 1 and µ0 = µ1 = µ2 = 0,
reflecting the fact that the bottom strategy is winning for Eloise.
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Finally, we consider an undetermined game:
u =


1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1


yielding the following constraints:
µ0 ≥ v
µ1 + µ3 ≥ v
µ1 + µ2 ≥ v
µ2 + µ3 ≥ v.
From the last three equations we derive that µ1 = µ2 = µ3. So µu is the
row vector
[µ0, 2µ1, 2µ1, 2µ1].
From the first equation, it follows that µ0 = 2µ1 so the minimal element in
this vector is only maximized by assignments for which µ0 = 2µ1. Since
we require that µ be a probability distribution, there is only one such
assignment: the one for which µ0 = 2/5 and µ1 = 1/5. Accordingly the
value of the game is 2/5.
It is tempting to replace the inequality symbols ≥ by the equality
symbol =. Doing so does not affect the outcome of the latter game, but
generally it is untrue that a maximizing µ yields a vector µu of the form[
U(µ, τ0), . . . , U(µ, τn−1)
]
of equal values. See for instance the game:

1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0

 (10)
Eloise’s strategy µ such that µ0 = µ1 = µ3 = 1/7 and µ2 = µ4 = 2/7
maximizes minτ (µ, τ ) = 3/7. However, U(µ, τ2) = 4/7. To see that there
is no maximizing µ that yields a vector µu of equal values, consider the
game’s corresponding linear programming problem, replacing ≥ by =, we
get
µ0 + µ1 + µ3 = v (11)
µ2 + µ3 = v (12)
µ2 + µ4 = v (13)
µ1 + µ2 = v (14)
µ3 + µ4 = v (15)
µ0 + µ4 = v. (16)
Eqs. (12) and (13) imply µ3 = µ4. In the same vein, Eqs. (13) and (14)
imply µ1 = µ4; Eqs. (15) and (16) imply µ0 = µ3; and Eqs. 12 and 15
imply µ2 = µ4. We conclude that µ0 = . . . = µ4 = 1/5, contradicting
Eqs. (11) and (12).
11
3.2 Bounds and characterizations
For an m× n matrix u, we let col-min(u) denote
min
{
ΣColu(0), . . . ,ΣColu(n− 1)
}
,
and col-argmin(u) the set of indices 0 ≤ j < n for which
ΣColu(j) = col-min(u).
In a similar way we introduce row-max and row-argmax. We define
Floor(u) =
col-min(u)
m
and
Ceil(u) =
row-max(u)
n
.
For instance, the matrix u in (10) has Floor(u) = 1/5 and Ceil(u) =
3/6.
Proposition 3. For a game u,
1. Floor(u) = minν U(µ¯, ν), where µ¯ is Eloise’s uniform strategy; and
2. Floor(u) ≤ V (u).
Proof. Claim (1). Suppose u is an m×n game. Eloise’s strategy µ¯ assigns
1/m to each strategy 0 ≤ i < m. Multiplying µ¯ with u yields:
[
ΣColu(0)/m, . . . ,ΣColu(n− 1)/m
]
.
Abelard picks a strategy that yields
min
j
U(µ¯, j) = col-min(u)/m = Floor(u)
for Eloise. By Eq. (9), no mixed strategy of Abelard can outperform j,
given that Eloise plays µ¯:
min
j
U(µ¯, j) = min
ν
U(µ¯, ν).
Claim (2). Playing µ¯ yields at least Floor(u) for Eloise, by Claim (1).
So Eloise can secure at least Floor(u) in u.
Proposition 4. For a game u,
1. Ceil(u) = maxµ U(µ, ν¯), where ν¯ is Abelard’s uniform strategy; and
2. V (u) ≤ Ceil(u).
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. For a balanced game u,
1. V (u) = Floor(u) = Ceil(u); and
2. the strategy profile (µ¯, ν¯) is an equilibrium in u.
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Proof. Claim (1). Suppose u is an m × n game. By the fact that the
game is column balanced it follows from Proposition 3 that the value of
the game is at least
Floor(u) =
ΣColu(0)
m
.
By the fact that the game is row balanced it follows from Proposition 4
that the value of the game is at most
Ceil(u) =
ΣRowu(0)
n
.
Since u is row balanced, it has precisely mΣRowu(0) entries with a 1;
since it is column balanced, it has precisely nΣColu(0) entries with a
1. Hence, mΣRowu(0) = nΣColu(0), and it follows that the upper and
lower bounds coincide, since we have that
ΣRowu(0)
n
=
ΣColu(0)
m
.
The equality V (u) = Ceil(u) can be derived similarly.
Claim (2). Observe that:
U(µ¯, ν¯) ≤ max
µ
U(µ, ν¯) = min
ν
U(µ¯, ν) ≤ U(µ¯, ν¯).
The equality follows from Claim (1) and Propositions 3.1 and 4.1; the
inequalities follow from the definition of max and min, respectively. It
follows that
max
µ
U(µ, ν¯) = U(µ¯, ν¯) = min
ν
U(µ¯, ν).
From this equality it follows that for every µ and ν,
U(µ, ν¯) ≤ max
µ
U(µ, ν¯) = U(µ¯, ν¯) = min
ν
U(µ¯, ν) ≤ U(µ¯, ν),
and (µ¯, ν¯) is an equilibrium of u, by definition.
Example 6. Consider the n× n matrix u with 1s on the diagonal:

1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 0 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 1 0
0 0 · · · 0 1


.
This matrix is obviously balanced. Whence, by Proposition 5, the value
is 1/n. Note that u is isomorphic to games Γ(M, φMP) of the Matching
Pennies sentence on structures M with n elements.
A row submatrix u′ of u is any matrix that can be obtained by deleting
any number of rows from u (in any order).
Proposition 7. For a game u,
max
u′
Floor(u′) ≤ V (u),
where u′ ranges over the nonempty row submatrices of u.
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Proof. Suppose u is an m× n matrix. For a row submatrix u′ of u with
m′ rows, define the mixed strategy µ in the game of u for which
µ(i) =
{
1/m′ if Rowu(i) is also a row in u′
0 otherwise.
The strategy µ plays all rows in u′ with equal probability, and does not
play any of the rows in u that do not sit in u′. Hence µu yields
[
ΣColu
′
(0)/m′, . . . ,ΣColu
′
(n− 1)/m′
]
.
The minimal value in this vector equals Floor(u′). So Eloise can iterate
through all row submatrices u′. Then, she can secure Floor(u′) by playing
the mixed strategy associated with a u′ that maximizes Floor(u′).
Proposition 8. Let u′ be a row submatrix of the game u. If u′ is balanced
and
row-max(u) = row-max(u′),
then
1. V (u) = V (u′); and
2. the strategy profile (µ¯, ν¯) of Eloise’s and Abelard’s uniform strategies
in u′ respectively, is an equilibrium in u.
Proof. Claim (1). By Propositions 7 and 5.1,
V (u′) ≤ V (u),
and by Propositions 4.2,
V (u) ≤ Ceil(u).
Since u′ is balanced, it follows from Proposition 5.1 that
Floor(u′) = V (u′) = Ceil(u′).
Since row-max(u) = row-max(u′), we have that Ceil(u) = Ceil(u′). Hence
V (u′) = V (u).
Claim (2). By Proposition 5.2, the pair of uniform strategies (µ¯, ν¯) is
an equilibrium in u′, whence for every mixed strategy ν in u′,
U ′(µ¯, ν¯) ≤ U ′(µ¯, ν),
where U ′ is the expected utility function of u′. Since u′ is a submatrix of
u, U ′ and U agree on every pair of mixed strategies in the domain of U ′.
Since u′ is a row submatrix of u, Abelard’s set of strategies in the two
games coincide. Therefore, the latter inequality boils down to
U(µ¯, ν¯) ≤ U(µ¯, ν),
for every mixed strategy ν of Abelard in u. Remark that strictly speaking,
in this inequality, µ¯ denotes Eloise’s mixed strategy in u that is uniform
in the strategies that are shared between u and u′.
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If Abelard plays ν¯, Eloise can secure the maximal element in uν¯. For
the transposition of this vector write
[w0, . . . , wm′−1, wm′ , . . . , wm−1] ,
assuming u is an m × n game and u′ is an m′ × n game, with m′ ≤ m.
Since u′ is balanced all its rows have the same sum, namely row-max(u′) =
row-max(u). Thus,
row-max(u)/n = w0 = . . . = wm′−1.
Here we assume that the first m′ rows in u constitute u′, which obviously
goes without loss of generality. Furthermore, we may assume that
wm′−1 ≥ wm′ ≥ . . . ≥ wm−1.
Since µ¯ only assigns non-zero probabilities to the first m′ strategies, no
mixed strategy µ of Eloise in u can outperform µ¯, given that Abelard
plays ν¯:
U(µ, ν¯) ≤ U(µ¯, ν¯).
It follows that (µ¯, ν¯) is an equilibrium in u.
4 Applications
We give two applications of the tools developed to equilibrium semantics.
4.1 Birthday problem
Considered is a party attended bym persons. What is the probability that
there is a pair of individuals that have the same birthday? A straightfor-
ward combinatorial argument shows that the probability exceeds 50 per
cent when m > 20.
The “birthday problem” can be redefined in terms of drawing m balls
(number of guests) from an urn of n balls (number of birthdays) with
replacement. We are interested in the odds that we draw the same ball
twice.
Given the first ball b0, the probability that the second ball b1 is not
equal to b0 is
n− 1
n
.
Similarly, given i distinct balls b0, . . . , bi−1, the probability that the next
ball is not among the balls drawn earlier is
(n
n
)(n− 1
n
)(
n− 2
n
)
. . .
(
n− i
n
)
.
It follows that the odds that b0, . . . , bm−1 are all distinct is
n!
nm(n−m)!
. (17)
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We define the process of randomly drawing m balls from the urn in IF
logic. Consider the IF sentence
φm = ∀x0 . . . (∀xm−1/Xm−1)(∃xm/Xm) . . . (∃x2m−1/X2m−1)ψm
where Xk = {x0, . . . , xk−1} and
ψm =
∨
0≤i<m
∨
i<j<m
(xi + xi+m) = (xj + xj+m),
in which the addition operator is defined as ak + al = ak+lmodn assuming
that the n objects in the domain at hand are labeled a1, . . . , an−1. In an
extensive game of φm, Abelard and Eloise pick m objects each. Abelard’s
first object a0 is added to Eloise’s first object am, and so on for the other
m − 1 objects. Since Eloise does not know any of Abelard’s choices, the
object bi = ai+ am+i is effectively chosen at random. Eloise wins if there
is a pair of sums bi = bj with i < j; otherwise Abelard wins.
Proposition 9. The probability that a random sample of m elements
from a set of n elements (with replacement) contains at least one pair of
duplicates is V (M, φm) for any structure M of size n in which the addition
operator is defined as above.
Proof. Both Abelard and Eloise have nm choices for their respective quan-
tifiers. Then, Eloise has two disjunction choices knowing Abelard’s and
her own moves (or more if we permit ourselves only binary disjunctions).
Given this knowledge, she has an “optimal substrategy”: chose the first
disjunct that holds with respect to the chosen objects, if such a disjunct
exists; otherwise, select an arbitrary disjunct. It is clear that this strat-
egy outperforms or is equivalent to any other substrategy she may have,
given the objects selected for the objects. It has been shown that we can
remove such “weakly dominated” and “payoff equivalent” strategies from
the strategic game, without affecting the game’s value [10, Proposition
7.25].
Thus we can focus on the game that is the result of eliminating weakly
dominated and payoff equivalent strategies. In this reduced game, each
of Abelard’s and Eloise’s strategies corresponds to an ordered series of
n objects from M . So, each player has nm strategies. Consider any
strategy (a0, . . . , am−1) of Abelard. Let us count the number of strategies
(am, . . . , a2m−1) of Eloise against which Abelard’s strategy results in a
loss for Eloise. The object am can be chosen in any way we want, yielding
n choices. Write bi for ai + am+i. Given a series of i distinct objects
b0, . . . , bi−1, there are n− i objects am+i for which
ai + am+i /∈ {b0 . . . , bi−1}.
So every strategy of Abelard loses against n(n − 1)(n − 2) . . . (n −m) =
n!/(n −m)! strategies of Eloise, and wins against
nm −
n!
(n−m)!
(18)
strategies. The strategy of Abelard was chosen without loss of generality;
it follows that u is row balanced and that the value (18) equals nm −
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col-min(u), where u is the matrix of the reduced strategic game of φm on
M. Since u has nm columns,
Floor(u) =
col-min(u)
nm
=
n!
nm(n−m)!
= (17).
A symmetric argument shows that u is also row balanced. By Propo-
sition 5 it follows that the value of φm on M is (17).
What is at stake in the birthday problem is the number of pairs of
party goers m(m−m)/2, which is quadratic in m. This is reflected in the
IF sentence φm, which has 2m quantifiers to simulate the random selection
of m objects. The quantifier-free prefix ψm has m(m−1)/2 disjuncts, one
for each pair of distinct party goers.
4.2 Universal hashing
In this section we use IF logic to describe the game theory behind universal
hashing, a notion from computer science. Hashing functions are used to
map an unknown set S from a set of objects U called keys, to a set of
hash values V . If we have a linear order on V , then we can use a hash
function to store the elements from S in a hash table, which allows for
binary search.
For instance, we can think of U as the collection of all finite strings
with at most 100 characters, S as the set of Dutch names, and V as some
range of integers in an administration system. Surely, we do not want to
reserve as many integers as there are elements in U ; a hash function helps
us transfer an arbitrary key from U to a hash value in V .
By the pigeon hole principle, if S has more elements than V , for every
hash function, there is a pair of keys k, l ∈ U that are mapped to the same
hash value. Such a pair of objects is said to collide. Collision handling
is typically resource intensive, for which reason we want to select a hash
function that minimizes the expected number of collisions not knowing
the set S of keys that will actually materialize. The following fragment
explains hashing as a game.
“If a malicious adversary chooses the keys to be hashed
by some fixed hash function, then he can choose n keys that
all hash to the same slot, yielding an average retrieval time
[that is linear in n]. Any fixed hash function is vulnerable
to such terrible worst-case behavior; the only effective way to
improve the situation is to choose the hash function randomly
in a way that is independent of the keys that are actually going
to be stored. This approach, called universal hashing, can yield
provably good performance on average, no matter what keys
are chosen by the adversary.
The main idea behind universal hashing is to select the hash
function at random from a carefully designed class of functions
at the beginning of execution. [. . . ] Poor performance occurs
only when the compiler chooses a random hash function that
causes the set of identifiers to hash poorly, but the probability
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of this situation occurring is small and is the same for any set
of identifiers of the same size.” [2, pp. 232–3]
We will work on hash structures
M =
(
M,UM, (fMi )0≤i<n
)
,
where UM ⊆M are the keys,M−UM the hash values, (fMi )i is the series of
all functions from UM toM −UM and i is an injective indexing of thereof.
The assumption that a hash structure records all possible hash functions
with respect to the set of keys and values at hand is very strong. We will
return to this assumption before we leave this section.
The game dynamics described in the first part of the first paragraph
are captured by:
φH =
∨
i
∀x∀y
[(
U(x) ∧ U(y) ∧ x 6= y
)
→ fi(x) 6= fi(y)
]
,
in which the operator
∨
i is object language.
In a game of φH on a hash structure M, triggered by
∨
i Eloise chooses
the index i of the hash function fMi . Then, Abelard in the capacity of
malicious adversary chooses two keys for x and y. If they collide with
respect to fMi , Abelard wins. As we pointed out above, by the pigeonhole
principle, Abelard has a winning strategy whenever |U | > |V |.
As explained in the remainder of the quotation, in the universal hash-
ing scenario, Eloise tries to confuse Abelard by drawing her hash function
at random. We will show that the optimal way to randomly select a hash
function coincides with Eloise’s equilibrium strategy in the game described
by
φUH =
∨
i
(∀x/i)(∀y/i)
[(
U(x) ∧ U(y) ∧ x 6= y
)
→ fi(x) 6= fi(y)
]
.
Assume U = {k0, . . . , kn−1} and V = {0, . . . ,m − 1}. For a function
f : U → V , let Pf be the set of its pre-images:
Pf = {f
−1(v) : v ∈ V }.
The degree of a function f is the difference between the sizes of the
largest and smallest pre-image in Pf :
max
{
|P | : P ∈ Pf
}
−min
{
|P | : P ∈ Pf
}
.
For every U and V there is a function f : U → V of degree (at most) 1,
see for instance the function
f(ki) = i mod m.
This function has in fact degree 0 whenever n mod m = 0.
In the context of the game Γ(M, φUH), Sd denotes the set of strategies
of Eloise that pick indices i for which fMi has degree d. Each strategy of
Abelard corresponds to the pair of keys (k, l) it assigns to x and y. We
write T ∗ for the set of strategies of Abelard that assign distinct keys to x
and y.
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Proposition 10. Let d = min{1, n mod m} and S∗ = Sd. The pair of
uniform strategies (µ¯, ν¯) over S∗ and T ∗ respectively is an equilibrium in
Γ = Γ(M, φUH).
Proof. Every strategy of Abelard that does not sit in T ∗ is losing for
Abelard, and therefore weakly dominated by every strategy in T ∗. Whence,
we may discard these dominated strategies from our analysis, see [10,
Chapter 7]. T ∗ contains n2 − n strategies.
We consider a function λ on the set of functions of type U → V . Let f
be one particular function of this type. Write ifmax for a value with largest
pre-image:
ifmax = argmaxi
{
|f(i)−1|
}
.
Let k∗ be any element in f(ifmax)
−1. Similarly, write ifmin for a value with
smallest pre-image:
ifmin = argmini
{
|f(i)−1|
}
.
Then, λ sends f to the function λ(f) for which
λ(f)(k) =
{
ifmin if k = k
∗
f(k) otherwise.
If a collision occurs, it is more likely to happen between keys that are sent
to ifmax than to keys sent to i
f
min. The operator λ levels the probability
that a collision occurs at ifmax and the probability that one occurs at i
f
min.
We will see that it also decreases the likelihood of a collision appearing in
the first place.
Write σ and σ′ for Eloise’s strategies in Γ that pick the indices of f
and f ′ = λ(f), respectively. We show that σ loses against more strategies
of Abelard than σ′. Eloise’s strategy σ loses against Abelard’s strategies
in
Lσ =
⋃
P∈Pf
LP .
where
LP =
{
(k, l) ∈ T ∗ : k, l ∈ P
}
.
Similarly, σ′ loses against the strategies in Lσ′ =
⋃
P∈Pf′
LP . To show
that |Lσ| > |Lσ′ |, it suffices to show that∣∣L
f(i
f
max)
−1
∣∣+ ∣∣L
f(i
f
min
)−1
∣∣ > ∣∣L
f ′(i
f
max)
−1
∣∣+ ∣∣L
f ′(i
f
min
)−1
∣∣, (19)
because the other pre-images are shared between f and f ′. For a pre-
image P of size z, LP contains z(z − 1) elements. Whence, if f(i
f
min)
−1
contains x elements, ∣∣L
f(i
f
max)−1
∣∣ = x(x− 1)∣∣L
f ′(i
f
max)−1
∣∣ = (x− 1)(x− 2).
Likewise, if f(ifmin)
−1 contains y elements,∣∣L
f(i
f
min
)−1
∣∣ = y(y − 1)∣∣L
f ′(i
f
min
)−1
∣∣ = (y + 1)y.
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Hence, Eq. (19) reduces to
x(x− 1) + y(y − 1) > (x− 1)(x− 2) + (y + 1)y,
which is the case if x > y + 1.
We leave it as an exercise to the reader to verify that for any function
f of degree d′ > 1, there is a finite series
f, λ(f), λ
(
λ(f)
)
, . . . , λ
(
. . . λ
(
λ(f)
)
. . .
)
of which the final element has degree d′ − 1. Thus, iterative application
of λ ultimately yields a function with degree d. As we have just shown
above, every application of λ yields a hash function that further reduces
the number of strategies against which the strategy loses that picks the
index of that hash function. If we reach a function with degree d, applying
λ no longer reduces this number. It can further be checked that as long
as λ can be applied, x > y + 1.
It is easy to see that every two functions with degree d suffer from an
equal number of collisions. Let Γ∗ be the subgame of Γ induced by S∗
and T ∗, that is, Γ∗ is of the form (S∗, T ∗, u∗) where u∗(σ, τ ) = u(σ, τ ),
for any σ ∈ S∗ and τ ∈ T ∗.
Our λ-argument showed that row-max(u∗) = row-max(u). Since every
two functions of degree d suffer from the same number of collisions, u∗ is
row balanced. It is easy to see that u∗ is also column balanced. We apply
Proposition 8.2 to infer that (µ¯, ν¯) is an equilibrium in Γ.
We have seen in the section on the birthday problem, Section 4.1,
that we can simulate drawing random objects, but we were incapable of
extending this method to drawing random functions. It appears to us that
if we have a means to express randomization over functions, we can utilize
this mechanism to express universal hashing without assuming structures
that carry all possible hash structures.
If it turns out that IF logic can express random functions, or if it turns
out that it cannot, we may be able to use this to prove new upper or lower
bounds on the expressive power of IF under equilibrium semantics. In fact,
if the former is the case — i.e., IF logic can express random functions — it
would be most interesting to see if it has natural fragments that coincide
with randomized complexity classes in the style of Fagin’s Theorem, which
showed that second-order existential logic coincides with the complexity
class NP [4].
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